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PROBLEMS OF EVIL: MORE ADVICE TO
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS I
Marilyn McCord Adams

The argument that
(I)

God exists, and is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good

(2)

Evil exists

and

are logically incompatible, can be construed aporetically (as generating a puzzle and posing the
constructive challenge of finding a solution that displays their compatibility) or atheologically (as a
positive proof of the non-existence of God). I note that analytic philosophers of religion over the
last thirty years or so have focused on the atheological deployment of the argument from evil, and
have met its onslaughts from the posture of defense. I take Nelson Pike (in his article "Hume on
Evil") and Alvin Plantinga (in The Nature of Necessity, "Self-Profile," and other pieces) as paradigm
defenders, analyse their approaches, and try to make explicit parameters and assumptions within
which these defenses have been conducted. In particular, both writers seem to attempt a reply within
the parameters of a religion-neutral value theory and on the assumption that God has obligations to
do one thing rather than another in creation-both of which conspire to defend God as a producer
of global goods and shift attention off the more pressing question of His agent-centered goodness.
I then argue that value-theory pluralism explodes the myth of shared values, and so complicates the
structure of fair-minded debate about the problem of evil as to significantly limit the utility of
defense. I invite Christian philosophers to approach the problem aporetically, and to exhibit the
compossibility of (I) and (2) by formulating their own beliefs about how God is solving the problem
of evil using the valuables within a Christian value theory to defeat evils. After sketching a strategy
for doing this, I answer the objection that my recommendation conflates Christian philosophy and
theology, and try to show how it affords a continuity between the so-called philosophical and
existential problems of evil.

Introduction
"If God exists, how can evils be explained? For an omnipotent, being
would have the power to prevent any and all evils if it wanted to; an
omniscient being would know all about them; and a perfectly good
being would want to prevent/eliminate all the evils it could. Thus, it
seems, if God existed, and were omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly
good, there would be no evils."2
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When, in history of philosophy, a number of prima facie plausible premisses
seem to generate a problematic conclusion, the resultant argument can be said
to formulate a problem, which can be dealth with in various ways. One can
simply accept the argument as sound and its surprising conclusion as true.
Alternatively, one may remain confident that the conclusion is false but see the
argument as creating a difficulty for anyone who rejects it: that of explaining
how the prima facie plausible premisses are not all so acceptable, the inferences
not so evident, as they seem. To respond the latter way is to take the argument
aporetically, as generating a puzzle. What is important to note is that the same
argument can be taken in both directions. Sometimes consensus gathers around
one reading-as when most philosophers took Zeno's paradoxes and Parmenides'
arguments against the possibility of change as aporetic. In other cases, both
usages persist, but one predominates-as in the case of sceptical arguments about
the existence of other minds and/or a physical world, about the possibility of
knowledge, etc.
The traditional problem of evil stated above participates in this ambiguity. I
want to examine how the different ways of taking it generate contrasting
methodologies and chart how focus on one is limiting our progress. I want then
to suggest how Christian philosophers might best approach it, to maximize their
contributions to this deepest of religious problems.
1. The Aporetic Version:
Understood aporetically, the traditional problem of evil gives crisp focus to a
difficulty in understanding the relationship between God and evil. In particular,
there is a prima facie obstacle to consistently maintaining both
(1) God exists, and is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good

and
(2) Evil exists,
not because there is an explicit logical contradiction between them, 3 but because
our pre-analytic understandings of 'omnipotent' and 'perfectly good' construe
the maximizations straightforwardly, in such a way as to render
(PI) A perfectly good being would always eliminate evil so far as it
could,
and
(P2) There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do
plausibly true. (1), (2), (PI), and (P2) seem to constitute an inconsistent quartet,
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so that there is a valid inference from the conjunction of the last three to the
denial of the first. When taken aporetically, the challenge of this argument is
constructive: it is an invitation to probe more deeply into the logical relations
among these propositions, to offer more rigorous and subtle analyses of the
divine perfections. (PI) and (P2) are not held to have anything more than prima
facie plausibility in their favor. And the aporetic argument serves a positive
function of structuring the discussion and enabling one to pinpoint and contrast
various resolutions in a precise way.
Notice, even those who (like many ofthe great medieval philosophers) accepted
(2) as empirically obvious and held (1) as demonstrable a priori or as a non-negotiable item of faith, could recognize a problem of understanding how (1) and (2)
are compossible-of articulating (1), (2), and one's understanding of the divine
attributes in such a way as to exhibit their compossibility.
2. The Atheistic Argument from Evil

In the modem period, however, David Hume started a trend of using such an
argument from evil to give a positive disproof of divine existence.' In "Evil and
Omnipotence" (first published in 1955), that neo-Humean J. L. Mackie sets out
to establish, "not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are
positivelyirrational" by showing that "the several parts of the essential theological
doctrine"-viz., (1) and (2)-"are inconsistent with each other."5 Once again,
Mackie recognizes that (1) and (2) are not explicitly contradictory; one needs
"some additional premisses, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the
terms 'good,' 'evil,' and 'omnipotent'." But, to his mind, these are readily
supplied by (PI) and (P2) above. 6 To be sure, Mackie admits, a theologian might
try to rebut his atheistic argument from evil by making "a minor modification
of one or more of the constituent propositions [viz., (1), (2), (PI), and/or (P2)],
which WOUld, however, still satisfy all the essential requirements of ordinary
theism."? But on Mackie's deployment of the argument, (PI) and (P2) are now
advanced, not as pre-analytic guesses as to what is meant by 'omnipotence' and
'perfect goodness,' but as principles having presumption in their favor. Mackie
now talks as if the burden of proof is very much on the theologian to show that
some revision of (PI) and/or (P2) is still both reasonable and true to ordinary
religious belief. 8
3. Pike's Clarification:

In his model article, "Hume on Evil" (first published in 1963),9 Nelson Pike
examines the Humean atheistic argument from evil, and first discovers that it
requires reformulation. For, Pike contends, (PI) does not accurately reflect our
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ordinary moral intuitions, according to which we do not always blame a person
for permitting (not preventing) evil it was within his power to prevent.
"As a general statement, a being who permits (or brings about) an
instance of suffering might be perfectly good providing only that there
is a morally sufficient reason for his action."'o
If God had a morally sufficient reason for permitting (bringing about) instances
of suffering, then His non-prevention of such evils would not count against His
perfect goodness. To generate a logical contradiction from (1) and (2), one would
have to maintain
(P3) It is logically impossible for an omniscient, omnipotent being to
have a morally sufficient reason for permitting (bringing about)
evils,
a premiss which derives some plausibility from the fact that, ordinarily, morally
sufficient reasons for permitting (bringing about) evils arise from some ignorance
or weakness in the agent thus excused.
Pike's reformulation brings to the surface two assumptions implicit in the
Humean atheistic argument from evil: (i) that 'goodness' is to be understood in
terms, not of metaphysical or natural goodness, but rather of moral goodness;
and (ii) that God is understood to be a moral agent whose creative activities are
governed by moral obligations. II Accordingly, (iii) to say that God is perfectly
good is to imply that He fully lives up to those obligations in creation. That is
why, assuming (Pl), the existence of evil seems to count against it.
Moreover, following 1. S. Mill, Pike understands 'moral goodness' here in
the ordinary sense. Expanding on (i), Mill does not deny that there is such a
thing as metaphysical or natural goodness, which might be possessed in infinite
degree by "the Absolute" or God and be a property that pertains to God as He
is in Himself. However that may be, Mill insists that to count as worthy of
worship, a being must be perfectly good in the ordinary sense of that term, a
sense which is "relational" in that it implies that its possessor would deal with
the world and treat created persons in certain ways and not others. MiII chides
those who move to cut off such implications by equivocating on 'perfect goodness'
as being almost so misleading as to lie. 12
Finally, in the article "Hume on Evil," Pike assumes the perfections--{)mniscience, omnipotence, and perfect [moral] goodness in the ordinary sense-to
be essential to God, at least in the sense that 'for all x, if x is God, then x is
omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good' is analytic. That is how the conjunction of (2) with (PI & P2) or with (P3) is supposed to imply that God does not
exist, rather than that God exists but lacks one or more of these perfections.
Having thus clarified and fortified the atheistic argument from evil, Pike offers
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the believer what I shall call "an Epistemic Defense" against it. Assuming that
(2) refers not merely to some evil or other but to evils in the amounts and of
the kinds found in the actual world, Pike rules out as unpromising the piece-work
approach of arguing that this sort of evil could be logically connected with this
sort of good (e.g., injury with forgiveness) and that sort with some other sort
of good (e.g., danger with courage). Just as the atheologian cannot prove (P3)
by enumerating putative excuses for permitting (bringing about) evils and
rejecting them one by one, because he "could never claim to have examined all
the possibilities""; so also it is hopeless to catalog the evils and display logically
necessary connections with great enough particular goods. We may fare better,
however, if we look for a single good that could at once provide a "general"
morally sufficient reason for the permission of all the evils. 14 He turns for materials
to the Best of All Possible Worlds Theodicy, which asserts
(P4) God, being a perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent being,
would create the best of all possible worlds,
and
(P5) The best of all possible worlds contains instances of suffering as
logically indispensable components.
Pike reasons that if (P4) and (P5) were true, they would state a morally sufficient
reason-viz., the aim of creating the Best of All Possible Worlds (= BPW)-that
even an omniscient and omnipotent being could have for permitting (bringing
about) evils. Thus, the junction of (P4) and (P5) entails the falsity of (P3); just
as the conjunction of (1) with (P4 & P5) entails (2).'5
If we could know (P4) and (P5) to be true, or even possible, we would thus
be able not only to defeat the above atheistic argument from evil (by showing
(P3) to be false), but also to demonstrate the compossibility of (1) and (2) (let
us call this "a Demonstrative Defense"). Unfortunately, (P5) seems to be a
proposition which is possible if and only if necessary. And Pike concedes that
he sees no way to establish (P5) apart from (P4) and an a priori proof for the
existence of God (such as Leibniz thought he had). Consequently, Pike does not
think his borrowings from the Best of All Possible Worlds Theodicy put us in
a position to make the positive assertion that (1) and (2) are compossible. But
since the atheist is in no better position to show (P5) false than the theist is to
prove it true, Pike concludes that the atheist is not entitled to his claim of
inconsistency either. For since, for all he or the theist knows (P5) is true, for
all he or the theist knows (P3) is false, and a Scottish verdict of "not proven"
must be rendered. 16
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4. Plantinga's Defensive Apologetics:
In his numerous writings on the problem of evil, Alvin Plantinga has concentrated
on formulating a Demonstrative Defense against "atheological arguments" such
as we have been discussing (in sections 2 and 3 above). 17 Reviewing the logical
structure of a defense, Plantinga writes,
"One way to show that P and Q are consistent is to find some other
proposition R such that P and R togehter entail Q ... "18
In the special case of the atheistic argument from evil, what is wanted is some
proposition R which (i) is itself logically possible, (ii) is logically consistent
with (1), and (iii) either alone or together with (l) entails (2). Plantinga emphasizes
that it is not necessary in addition thatR be (iv) true, (v) probable, (vi) plausible,
or (vii) believed by either the atheist or the theist. 19 On the other hand, conditions
(i)-(iii) would be trivially satisfied by some R for any pair of propositions that
is logically consistent. Since Plantinga aims to convince the atheologian of the
consistency of (1) and (2) by locating an appropriate R, he elsewhere indicates
that R must satisfy the following additional conditions: both (viii) its logical
possibility and (ix) its compossibility with (1) must be fairly c1ear. 20 But if "the
R you propose has to fit the audience you mean to address ,"2 I it would be too
polemical to present an R that the defender himself does not regard as meeting
conditions (i) and (ii).22
Assuming, once again, that (2) asserts not merely the existence of some evils
or other, but evils in the amounts and of the kinds found in the actual world,
one might try to construct R piece-meal, as the conjunction of logically possible
morally sufficient reasons for evils of each type found here below. Like Pike,
Plantinga thinks it would be a mistake to try to "get specific" about morally
sufficient reasons this way. For the actual workd contains certain kinds of evils,
so appalling and so horrifying~.g., the lingering death by leukemia or cancer
of young children or their mothers, the ironic evils of a father's accidentally
running over his beloved child, and the demonic evils of the death camps in
which a mother is forced to choose which of her children will live-that we not
only do not know why God permits them, we cannot even conceive of any
plausible candidate-reasons. Instead, we have to proceed "on a quite general
level. "23
Focusing on the other principal response to the problem of evil, the Free Will
Defense, Plantinga constructs his actual candidate for R with an eye on Mackie's
main objection to it-viz., that if God existed and were going to create free
creatures, He could have and therefore should have created only sinless ones.
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Thus, Plantinga proposes
R*:

God has actualized a possible world A containing significantly
free creatures (angels, human beings, other kinds, what have you)
with respect to whose actions there is a balance of good over evil
(so that A is on balance a very good world); some of these creatures
are responsible for moral and natural evil; and it was not within
God's power to create significantly free creatures with respect to
whose actions there would be a better balance of good over evil
than that displayed in A.

The (i) possibility of R* and (ii) its compossibility with (1) rest on highly subtle
understandins of divine goodness and power (alternative to (PI) and (P2». Thus,
in The Nature of Necessity,2. Plantinga argues at some length that there are some
possible worlds that not even an omnipotent God can strongly actualize (contrary
to (P2». And he assumes (contrary to (PI) that a perfectly good God might
well accept evils (in amounts and of the kinds found in the actual world) as the
price of goods related to free creatures. R*'s entailment of (2) is obvious.
5. Defense within Religion-Neutral Value Theory:

Our reviews of Pike and Plantinga serve to illustrate how the attempt to mount
a defense (whether Epistemic or Demonstrative) against the atheological deployment of the argument from evil, drives the defender to exhibit the compossibility
of (1) and (2) in terms of (a) generic and global values drawn from (b) a
religion-neutral value theory, acceptable to the atheologian.
5.1. Pike and "Ordinary-Sense" Moral Goodness: Pike seems perfectly at ease
with the notion of a religion-neutral value theory, common to atheologian and
believer. In his anthology, he consistently draws on "ordinary" moral intuitions
and seconds Mill's insistence that unless God is perfectly good in the ordinary
sense of moral goodness applied to human beings, He is not worthy of worship
(see section 3 above).
No doubt, Pike is influenced here by the fairly wide-ranging agreement (even
within our pluralistic society) about the sorts of acts that are morally wrong
and/or praiseworthy, the character traits that count as virtuous or vicious, and
the individuals who are saints and herois. Such extensional agreement underlies
the government of pluralistic society by common laws, its entertainment by
common literature and dramatic fare, etc.
More than that, Pike wrote "Hume on Evil" at Cornell in the early '60's,
when the Philosophy Department there was still in the grip of "ordinary language
philosophy." Recall that according to this methodology, philosophers who want
to find out truths about mind and body, morals, etc. should not go about inventing
philosophical theories, but should set about to analyze the concepts of mind,
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body, moral goodness, etc. implicit in our ordinary use of language. Insofar as
meaning is a matter of social convention, the philosopher proceeds to examine
linguistic usage with a view to making those conventions explicit.
5.2. The Myth of Shared Values: Many, perhaps most, analytic philosophers
have abandoned the ideals of "ordinary language philosophy" (and rightly so,
in my judgment) and resumed the traditional activity of theory-construction.
Once theorizing begins, however, the hope of universal agreement in value-theory
is shattered, the wide-ranging extensional over-laps notwithstanding. Witness,
for example, the divide in secular ethics between consequentialists and deontologists, whose principles reflect deeply contrasting moral intuitions and lead
to varied extensions.
If such disagreements in moral theory arise among philosophers who share a
common ontology, how much more should they diverge where ontological commitments are significantly different. (a) An ontology that holds, roughly, that
"what you see is what you get" may recognize such valuables as sensory pleasures,
the beauty of nature and cultural artifacts, the joy of creativity, and loving
personal intimacy. But it will be less rich that those which posit a Transcendent
Good (e.g., the Form of the Good, in Platonism, or God, the infinite being and
Supremely Valuable Object, in Christianity). Insofar as the highest human happiness is usually conceived of as involving some relation to the best good(s),
and moral precepts direct humans to their individual and collective ends, different
ontologies will produce different accounts of the human good and varying moral
precepts.
(b) Morover, we should expect moral theories to differ with respect to the origin
and structure of personal obligations, depending upon whether all the persons
recognized by the ontology share a common ontological status-inparticular,
whether all the persons are human-{)r instead there are supra-human persons.
Whereas atheistic value-theories assign all persons a common ontological status
as humans, and find it natural to see all persons as woven into a common web
of rights and mutual obligations, medieval Christian thinkers saw the divine
persons as free from any such entanglements. (i) Anselm argued that obligation
was correlated with ontological dependence, freedom from obligation with
ontological independence. Consequently, God the Creator, who exists by the
necessity of His nature, has no obligations to creatures, who nevertheless have
unconditional obligations to Him. (ii) Others (e.g., John Duns Scotus and William
Ockham argued that since God is the most valuable being, right reason would
dictate that He ought to be loved above all and for His own sake. Since God is
personal, that dictum implies another: that created persons have an unconditional
obligation to obey God's commands. On the other hand, God has no unconditional
obligation to love any finite good and so has no obligations to created persons.
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(c) Of crucial importance for the present discussion is the fact that different
ontological commitments with their different stores of valuables widen or narrow
the range of options for defeating evils with goods. Secular value theories can
offer only packages of immanent goods; some religious theories posit an infinite
transcendent goodness and invite relationship to it; while Christianity believes
the infinite good to be personal, and locates the happiness of finite persons in
loving personal intimacy with the divine persons.
5.3. Vagueness in Pike's Epistemic Defense: We have already noted how Pike

(i) works within the parameters of common-ground "ordinary" moral intuitions,
and (ii) seeks to provide (what for all we know may be) a morally sufficient
reason for divine permission of evils in terms of a generic and global good~viz.,
the Best of All Possible Worlds. In effect, his candidate for R would be
R**: God created the Best of All Possible Worlds, and the Best of All

Possible Worlds contains evils as logically indispensable constituents.
If the second conjunct could be known possible, Pike thinks, R** would be the
basis for a Demonstrative Defense. Failing that, since R** cannot be known to

be impossible, it provides an Epistemic Defense. Underlying these claims is the
assumed (for all we know) legitimacy of such theses as the Principle of Organic
Unity, with its consequence
(P6) that a significantly smaller, negatively valued part can contribute
to a greater over-all positive value in the whole,
and
(P7) a craftsman is morally permitted to make the bestto make the best
product he can
and/or
(P8) an agent is always morally permitted to bring about the morally
best state of affairs he can,
any and all of which could be found in a secular or religion-neutral value theory.
This account justifies God's choice in terms of a global good, because being
"Best Possible" is a feature of the world as a whole; it is generic, because it is
at once justification of each and every one of the evils that the world in question
contains. The further point I wish to make is that htis putative morally justifying
reason is thereby vague, twice-over: (i) First, there is the point acknowledged
by Pike, that it eschews any attempt to say how any given piece or specific type
of evil might "fit in" or contribute to making a given possible world the best.
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(ii) But by the same token, Pike does not tell us which sorts of goods contribute
to that result either. Insofar as Pike has followed the atheologian in focusing on
a moral evaluation of God's productive activity, he would seem to suggest that
divine permission of evils could be excusable if such evils were suitably ordered
into a package of merely immanent (created) goods of the sort recognized by
the religion-neutral value theory. On this reading, Pike would be appealing to
the epistemic possibility that evils (in the amounts and of the kinds found in this
world) be defeated by some appropriate combination of created goods. On the
other hand, Pike never denies that God, the being a greater than which is necessary
for the defeat of evils. Pike's Epistemic Defense based on R** is thus vague,
as to whether the permission of evils is to be exonerated in relation to the
immanent goods of secular value theoryu, or whether appeal must be made to
the transcendent good.
5.4. Plantinga's Double-Aspect Principles: Plantinga is explicit that a fullblown Christian value-theory will diverge considerably from a merely secular
one with regard to the range of valuables it includes. In a moving passage, he
draws on the Heidelberg catechism to suggest how God, the supreme good,
relates Himself to the evil of created suffering:
"As the Christian sees things, God does not stand idly by, coolly
observing the suffering of his creatures. He enters into and shares our
suffering. He endures the anguish of seeing his son, the second person
of the Trinity, consigned to the bitterly cruel and shameful death of the
cross. Some theologians claim that God cannot suffer. I believe they
are wrong. God's capacity for suffering, I believe, is proportional to
his greatness; it exceeds our capacity for suffering in the same measure
as his capacity for knowledge exceeds ours. Christ was prepared to
endure the agonies of hell itself; and God, the Lord of the universe,
was prepared to endure the suffering consequent upon his son's humiliation and death. He was prepared to accept this suffering in order to
overcome sin, and death, and the evils that afflict our world, and to
confer on us a life more glorious than we can imagine . . .25
But so far as the project of Demonstrative Defense is concerned, Plantinga wishes
to find an R that both he and the atheist can agree on as logically possible,
compatible with (1), and (whetheralone or together with (1» entailing (2). And
so Plantinga's R*, like Pike's R**, is generic and explicitly appeals only to
global goods-the existence of significantly free creatures, whose actions collectively yield a favorable balance of moral good over moral evil-which could be
recognized within an atheologian's value-theory.
Since Plantinga aims at persuasion, one might expect that those explicitly
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mentioned good-making features are supposed to suffice, by themselves, to
convince the atheologian that God could be morally in the clear in choosing a
possible world containing evils (in the amounts and of the kinds found in the
actual world). In recent correspondence, however, Plantinga makes clear that
he does not intend that these features by themselves would constitute a morally
sufficient reason for divine permission of evils. On the contrary, he writes,
"What would be the morally sufficient reason for allowing the devils
to perpetrate moral evil is the good of the entire possible world God
could thus actualize, a good as great or greater than any he could achieve
if he didn't permit the devils to carry on their evil ways. But of course
the good in question would not be the mere exercise of free will on the
part of the fallen angels; that would be a minuscule part of it. The good
in question would consist instead in such things as freely done good
actions on the parts of angels, human beings, and no doubt personal
creatures of other kinds, of the natural good of the whole world, and
of the unthinkably great good ofthe incarnation and the redemption."
[Italics mine.]26
This though was prefigured in his earlier paper, "The Probabilistic Argument
from Evil," where he writes that theist and atheist
"may differ, for example, with respect to the proportions of good and
evil in the universe at large; the Christian theist will no doubt concur
with St. Paul: 'For I reckon that the sufferings we now endure bear no
comparison with the spendor, as yet unrevealed, which is in store for
us'. (Romans 8: 18) They may also disagree as to the extent or amount
of good the universe contains. From a Christian point of view, there is
immortality and the expectation of a better world; and, towering above
aU, the unthinkable spendor of God's gift to mankind in the suffering
and death and resurrection of His Son . . ."27
In another letter, 28 Planting a suggests that the supernatural good of God's existence
might combine with the natural and moral goodness of the world to outweigh
evils (in the amounts and of the kinds found in the actual world), even apart
from the Incarnation and Atonement. Admittedly, the natural goodness of the
world and the supernatural goodness of divine existence and/or the Incarnation
and Redemption are not explicitly mentioned in Plantinga's R*; but they aren't
explicitly excluded either. It is because R* is compatible with these further goods,
that Plantinga recognizes R* as satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) above.
But then we may ask how R* is supposed to serve its function? For either the
atheologian will accept the explicit list-the good of created freedom and the
favorable balance of moral good over evil (a better than which God could not
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ensure)-as sufficient to establish R*'s satisfaction of conditions (i)-(iii) above,
or he will not. If he does not, it would seem that Plantinga cannot hope to
convince without making explicit additions. If the atheologian does, but Plantinga
does not, proffering R* as it stands seems misleading and unacceptably polemical
(by Plantinga's own lights).
In recent correspondence, Plantinga explains that R* is not designed
"to exhibit the main types of goods that outweigh the evils those worlds
contain; rather, I refer to the goods connected with free creatures because
these are the goods such that possibly God may have to put up with
evil in order to actualize them. "29
Insofar as the atheologian has conceded (for his own reasons) that a world would
be good enough for God to make but for feature F (in Mackie's case, the sins
of free persons other than God), R* therby wins neutral gound: the atheologian
will accept R* for hsi reasons (supplementing the explicit list of goods one way),
while Plantinga underwrites it for other reasons (filling out the list in a Christian
way). Put otherwise, R* is an abstract general propositition picking out an infinite
family of possible worlds. The atheologian looks at one branch, finds God and
evil there, and feels satisfied about the compossibility of (l) and (2). So far as
the aims ofthe Free Will Defense are concerned, Plantinga will be thus satisfied. 30
5.5. The Snares of Equivocation: Plantinga may be satisfied, but I am not.
For the truce just described between believer and atheologian feels disturbingly
similar to the agreement between Jones and Smith that reptiles are not extinct
in Los Angeles (where Jones believes the only reptiles left are snakes, while
Smith things only the lizards remain). Unfortunately, it is worse than that. Given
the above-mentioned pluralism in value-theory (see section 5.2 above), disagreements between Christians and atheologians about whether and what sorts of
goods could defeat evils are bound to emerge. But these differences will yield
varying, non-equivalent notions of 'perfect goodness' and contrasting evaluations
of evils, and so lead to equivocal interpretations of our original propositions (l)
and (2). Indeed, insofar as these perfections are analytically predicated of 'God,'
such variations in the notion of 'perfect goodness' beget different concepts of
God; insofar as they are regarded as non-essential predications of relative goodness, these differences yield widely divergent ascriptions of character. The upshot
is that the structure of any fair-minded debate about the problem of evil will be
much more complicated than literature in analytic philosophy of religion over
the last thirty years has made it to seem.
For suppose we take the atheologian like Mackie at his word, that the problem
he has in mind in alleging the inconsistency of (1) and (2) is "a logical problem,
the problem of clarifying and reconciling a number ofbeliefs."31 We must ask,
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"Whose beliefs?" and "according to whose interpretations?" Mackie has deployed
the problem of evil as a disproof for the existence of God, in the hope of showing
the religious beliefs of others contradictory and irrational. If he simply construes
(1) and (2) and the range of possible morally sufficient reasons, from the presumptive standpoint of his own value-theory, it would be a brilliant defensive maneuver
for the believer to show how the compossibility of (1) and (2) follows even
within the atheologian's point of view. But this would be a mere preliminary to
making explicit their disagreements in value-theory, and how they yield two
different problems of evil: the question of whether (1) and (2) are compossible
on the atheologian' s reading, and whether they can stand together on the believer's
rendering. Insofar as Mackie wished to show the believer's view contradictory
and irrational, he must take an interest in whether (l) and (2) can be understood
as compossible on the believer's construal of those claims. Likewise, it would
be a hollow victory for the believer to stop with showing that the God (essentially
omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good in Mackie's senses) that Mackie
doesn't believe in could coexist with evils, if that God is not the one the believer
confesses.
Once we appreciate how value-theory pluralism complicates discussions of
the problem of evil, however, we begin to see what a small place defense can
helpfully play in sorting matters out. The real philosophical work lies in
articulating and charting the implications of the contrasting positions. Assuming
both parties are genuinely interested in the issues, each will be drawn into the
project of deeper understanding to which the aporetic treatment of the problem
of evil invites us.
5.6. The Distortions of Defensiveness: Over the last thirty years, analytical
philosophers have treated the problem of evil primarily under its aspect as an
argument against the existence of God, and understood its resolutions primarily
in terms of defense. Perhaps this was all the climate of those times allowed; the
world of analytical philosophy has been hostile to theism, much less to Christianity. Further, much has been learned from these discussions, so lucidly epitomized
in the writings of Pike and Plantinga. Nevertheless, the nearly exclusive preoccupation with defense on the part of Christian philosophers has inadvertently
contributed to an obscuring of Christian views of the matter on several key points.
(1) The first is the metaphysical and moral stature of the divine persons. I
have noted how atheologians appear to take for granted what Pike makes explicit:
viz., that God, as personal, has obligations to do one thing rather than another
in creation. God, if He exists, is the chief manager of the universe and is morally
responsible for what goes on in it; the existence of evil would cast doubt on His
character and competence; the question is whether it would be possible to excuse
such a person for evils of the sort the actual world contains. H. J. McCloskey
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brings this out when he argues that God couldn't exist in a world with unnecessary
evils.32 Such assumptions are plausible within a value-theory whose ontology
contains persons all of whom are on an ontological par with each other. But
Christians do not view God this way. On the contrary, mainstream medieval
theologians argued that because of God's unique status in the ontology (as
necessarily existent Creator) and value-theory (as Supremely Valuable object),
the divine persons are not drawn down into the network of rights and obligations
among created persons (see section 5.2 above). Christian reticence on this matter
in discussions of the problem of evil has given the philosophical reading public
the wrong impression.
(2) The second is the dimension of divine goodness most fundamentally at
stake. The distortion in (1), which produced a defensive search for morally
sufficient reasons for divine permission of evils, created the impression that to
solve the logical problem of evil one must say why God would permit (bring
about) evils. And the attempt to satisfy this demand within the province of
religion-neutral value-theory led Pike and Plantinga to focus on global valuesthat a given possible world is the Best, that a given possible world includes the
existence of significantly free created persons whose actions yield a favorable
balance of moral good over moral evil (a balance a better than which God is
powerless to ensure). If successful, such defenses would vindicate divine goodness and power along the dimension "producer of global goods."
To be sure, Biblical religion does attribute to God the will, the wisdom, and
the power to produce a very good world (cf. Genesis I), and the history of
theology celebrates divine resourcefulness in imposing a marvellous order on
the whole, given what created persons come up with.
Nevertheless, the Christian characterization of divine goodness centers on
God's goodness to and love of persons , both individually and collectively as the
people of God. Those very horrific types of evil-the seemingly senseless, ironic,
and/or demonic deaths of the relatively innocent-that perplex Plantinga the
most and that prompted his shift to generic and global reason-giving, pose a
challenge to God's ability to win some global goods, because at a more fundamental level they radically call into question His love for and ability to benefit
the victims. Moreover, this latter problem is in no way met by pointing to
good-making features possessed by the world as a whole-whether it be some
"higher harmony," or the existence of valuable kinds of things (such as created
free persons, Mozart symphonies, natural beauty, etc.), or even an over-all
balance of retributive justice.
This limitation has not been lost on atheologians and rebels. Indeed, it forms
the basis of Ivan Karamazov's eloquent objection. 33 Mackie, too, notes that an
appeal exclusively to the greater goodness of the universe as a whole, seems to
imply "that God is not in our sense benevolent or sympathetic" "which might
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be a disturbing conclusion for some theists. "34 Perhaps, too, this is the legitimate
point to be taken away from J. S. Mill's warnings not to depart from ordinarysense moral goodness: viz., that we should not divert our attention away from
the issue of God's agent-centered goodness by concentrating solely on His role
as producer of global goods.
(3) The third consequence is the resultant apparent underestimation of the
depth of evils. Insofar as the explicitly offered morally sufficient reasons for
divine permission of evils have been drawn from a religion-neutral value-theory
(which, by definition, does not include divine being among its valuables), one
is invited to believe that evils (in the amounts and of the kinds found in the
actual world) are commensurate with some package of merely non-transcendent
goods. If Pike thinks that such evils as are found in this world could be defeated
only by the infinite (and incommensurate) goodness of God, he nowhere says
so in his writings. In only one of his published articles does Plantinga make
explicit his conviction that God's own goodness and redemptive acts are essential
to the balance. 35 Elsewhere the reader is left to believe that the existence of free
creatures whose actions yield a favorable balance of moral good over moral evils
is enough, or else to supplement these features with whatever other (compatible)
good-making features he believes in.
Yet, this apparent underestimation of evils serves neither the project of defense
nor the aim of Christian understanding. Atheists and rebels (such as Camus or
Ivan Karamazov) who focus on the enormous worth of individual persons and
how cruelly "life" treats them, find it morally outrageous. Moreover, it contradicts
Christian belief that only the goodness of God can defeat the power of Evil, and
the sense that horrific suffering by individuals is met only in the deeper sufferings
of God in Christ.
6. An Aporetic Approach to Christian Understanding:
How can Christian philosophers now best contribute to the solution of the
problem of evil? (I) My first recommendation is that we give up our focus on
defense, and its attempt to operate within religion-neutral value-theory, in favor
of an aporetic approach to the problem. It is time to devote ourselves to understanding and articulating our own beliefs about the relationship between God
and evil.
(II) Moreover, within this attempt, I think we should focus on God's agent-centered goodness-the very dimension rendered so baffling in the face of horrific
individual sufferings.
One might well ask whether we would not be fools to rush in where the last
generation of analytic philosophers of religion has feared to tread. My belief is
that we will not be, because our (aporetic) focus will be on understanding
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consistency rather than on defense. Concentration on the latter led Pike and
Plantinga to ask why God permits (brings about) evils and to search for logically
possible morally sufficient reasons. But to understand the logical compossibility
of (1) and (2), it is not necessary to know (even in a general way) why God
permits child torture or the ravages of cancer, if we can see how (at least in a
general way) God can be good enough to the individual sufferers nonetheless.
Ivan Karamazov contends that the latter project is likewise impossible, because
there is no possible way for God to make it up to such victims: the higher
harmony won't do, nor will the retributive suffering of the perpetrators, nor the
exposure of the truth, nor the higher eventual happiness of mankind. For Ivan,
it is God's justice to the individuals that must be vindicated; once the injustice
is permitted, there is no way it can be erased. 36
I beg to differ. Following Robert Adams, could we not construe divine goodness
to individuals in terms of His ensuring for each individual a life that (a) is a
great good to him on the whole, and (b) includes no deep suffering that is
unredeemed or meaningless. 37 Moreover, could we not defensibly regard both
conditions as met, not primarily in terms of justice to the individual, but rather
of the individual's relationships to great-enough goods? If so, our general answer
to the question of how God could be good enough to individual victims of horrific
sufferings, would be "by appropriately relating it to an incommensurate good."
Identifying this good and such relationships, would lead us to developments first
in Christian metaphysics and value-theory, and then into Christian soteriology.
(III) In my jUdgment, only religious value-theories contain anything valuable
enough to defeat the evil of horrific individual suffering. Following medieval
Christian philosophers, we could identify that valuable with God Himself. Distinguishing the good that God is in Himself, His essential metaphysical or natural
goodness from those relative properties of God that characterize His behavior
towards others, medievals identified the divine essence as the infinite being and
therefore the infinite (immeasurable) good, the Supremely Valuable Object. On
the basis of such a value-theory, one could maintain that a face-to-face vision
of God is an immeasurable good for individual created persons, enough by itself
to guarantee that condition (a) is satisfied for any individual who has it. 3"
Moreover, if we assume (as Plantinga does, see section 5.4 above) that God
Himself suffers, sufferings in the amounts and of the kinds found in this present
life could be given meaning as points of intimacy with God, so that condition
(b) could likewise be met. 39
(IV) If Christian metaphysics and value-theory has the resources to defeat
horrific evils, Christian soteriology charts God's general policy in distributing
these goods and hence describes God's relative goodness towards created persons.
Since Scripture and ecclesiastical pronouncements underdetermine doctrine, our
efforts will include attempted formulations, which will have, among other things,
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to be tested for their power to explain how (1) could be compossible with (2).
Failures would identify more precisely how evil is a theoretical problem for
Christians. Successes might have the apologetic value of clarifying what Christians really believe and advertising God as a character worthy of worship. Even
if the unbeliever denied the ontological commitments of Christian value-theory,
he might at least come to appreciate the internal coherence of the Christian
position, and withdraw his charge of irrationality.
7. Christian Philosophy or Christian Theology?
The approach I have been advocating is not so far removed from certain
general advice offered by Plantinga himself in his inaugural address of 1984:
" ... the Christian philosophical community need not devote all of its
efforts to attempting to refute opposing claims and/or to arguing for its
own claims, in each case from premises accepted by the bulk of the
philosophical community at large. It ought to do this; but it ought to
do more. For if it does only this, it will neglect a pressing philosophical
task: systematizing, deepening, clarifying Christian thought on these
topics."40
Whereas Plantinga's own treatments of evil have concentrated on the project of
. Demonstrative Defense, I urge that we now shift the lion's share of our energies
away from defense and instead explain consistency via "systematizing, deepening, and clarifying Christian thought" about God and evil.
To the extent that I embrace this project, however, I fall heir to the objection
raised by John Wippel, that such methodology fails properly to observe the
boundaries between philosophy, on the one hand, and theology, on the other.
Sketching a Thomistic perspective, Wippel notes Aquinas' distinction between
[i]

"certain truths concerning God and divine things which natural
reason can discover, truths such as God's existence, or God's
unity, and others of this kind . . . "

[ii]

... another kind of truth concerning divine things which completely surpasses human understanding ... revealed mysteries,
such as the Trinity or Incarnation. These could never be discovered
by unaided natural or philosophical means ... "4\

and

He then outlines the relationship between these "two sources of truth" along
three parameters: (a) Revealed truths provide a negative test of philosophical
accuracy. Since "there can be no real contradiction between the truth which
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natural reason or philosophy can discover and that truth which has been revealed
to man by God ... " "if anything is found in the sayings of the philosophers
which is contrary to religious belief, this is not philosophy but rather an abuse
or misuse of philosophy resulting from the weakness of human reason."42 (b)
Positive Proof: If a philosopher purports to demonstrate anything inconsistent
with the faith about a matter capable of rational demonstration, then it should
be possible to demonstrate the error of that philosopher. (c) Epistemic Defense:
If a philosopher claims or purports to demonstrate something that is not capable
of rational demonstration, then it should be possible to show that the alleged
philosophical conclusion has not in fact been demonstrated. 41 As for whether
"an intricate philosophical discussion of the relationship between the
divine persons within the Trinity, or a similar discussion of the distinction
between nature and person as applied to the mystery of the Incarnation"
counts as philosophical properly speaking, or as Christian philosophy, or "only
as straight theology," Wippel responds with a dilemma; where
"the philosophical inquiry itself presupposes the truth of religious
beliefs ... and there is no conceivable way in which such a truth or
truths can be demonstrated philosophically . . . one is in fact practicing
speculative theology, not pure philosophy, and not Christian philosophy. "44
On the other hand, where
"one's philosophical investigation is directed to articles of religious
belief ... that cannot be demonstrated philosophically ... but in such
a way that philosophical inquiry does not rest upon or presuppose in
any way that the articles of faith are true . . . "
Wippel contends that "this kind of inquiry could be undertaken by the nonbeliever
as well as by the believer" and so would not count as Christian philosophy either. 45
Wippel's principal focus is on whether the truth of various propositions can
be known, proved, or demonstrated by unaided natural reason, or whether it has
to be supernaturally revealed. Following Aquinas, Wippel rests this contrast on
the assumption of classical foundational ism in epistemology, according to which
there are some premisses to which all rational people would agree and from
which at least some interesting metaphysical conclusions can be drawn (e.g.,
the existence and unity of God).
For my part, I reject classical foundational ism in favor of sceptical realism.
I am a realist about philosophical/theological theories in that I believe there is
some fact of the matter, independently of what we think, believe, or conceive
of in our theories. I am a sceptic, however, because I believe that the defense
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of any well-fonnulated philosophical position will eventually involve premisses
which are fundamentally controversial and so unable to command the assent of
all reasonable persons. Given this outlook, I conceive of the task of philosophy
as that of mapping the problems by formulating the alternative positions as fully
as possible. This task will involve conceptual analysis and argumentation to
clarify the inter-relations among the various claims, and the costs and benefits
of alternative approaches. Each philosopher will have a certain set of intuitions
that draw him in the direction of one premiss set or another, and he will have
a particular commitment to develop that particular theoretical outlook so
thoroughly and rigorously as to exhibit it as a viable competitor in the theoretical
market place. But demonstrative proofs and disproofs~.g., that idealism is
true and materialism false-will not be in the offing.
Given my more modest expectations of the philosophical project, I think it is
inevitable that a Christian philosopher who attempts to fonnulate his own intuitions about philosophical matters should end up integrating his religious beliefs
into his philosophical theories. As more and more of us follow Plantinga's
inaugural advice and enter into the aims of the Society of Christian philosophers,
the philosophical profession should not be surprised to find us mounting theological theories of necessary truth, moral value and the human good, the ontological
status of properties, etc.
Wippel might reply that I have avoided the first hom of his dilemma only by
impaling myself on the second. Just as an idealist can (and should) anticipate
the materialist's responses to idealistic arguments, and work to see how the
materialist position could be developed in its strongest form; so no religious
commitment is required for analysing the content of religious beliefs, testing
them for consistency, drawing out their implications, etc. Hence, there is nothing
specifically Christian about this activity.
I agree with this to a point. On my view, understanding a philosophical problem
involves sympathetically entering into opposing positions to detennine their
logical structure, their theoretical advantages and disadvantages. Insofar as
atheologians such as Mackie have contributed to the clarification of religious
belief, Christian philosophers are in their debt. On the other hand, insofar as a
significant part of theory-fonnulation involves articulating of inchoate intuitions,
it may be that the philosopher whose intuitions they are is in a better position
than others to make them rationally accessible. At any rate, from a Christian
point of view, he will have a special vocation to do so, insofar as they are his
intuitions and part of God's gift to him in calling him to philosophize. Hence,
my recommendation that we Christian philosophers now devote special attention
to fonnulating our Christian understanding of the relation between God and evil.
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8. The Existential versus the Philosophical Problem of Evil:

It has been customary, in the literature, to contrast a "theoretical" (philosophical
or theological) problem about the logical compossibility of (1) and (2) with the
"existential" problem of how to cope with life in the face of evils many and
great. Plantinga sharply distinguishes the former from the latter in The Nature
of Necessity:

". . . there is no good atheological argument from evil. The existence
of God is neither precluded nor rendered improbable by the existence
of evil. Of course suffering and misfortune may none the less constitute
a problem for one who believes in God; but the problem is not that
presented by holding beliefs that are logically or probabilistically incompatible. He may find a religious problem in evil; in the presence of his
own suffering or that of someone near to him, he may fail to maintain
a right attitude towards God. Faced with great personal suffering or
misfortune, he may be tempted to rebel against God, to shake his fist
in God's face, to curse God. He may despair of God's goodness, or
even give up belief in God altogether. . . "46
As Plantinga characterizes it, the spiritual problem resolves into the deontic fact
that there are certain attitudes it is not right to have towards God, and the
psychological difficulty of avoiding these attitudes in the face of horrific evils.
Surviving defense as it does, this predicament "calls for pastoral rather than
philosophical counsel."47 Ten years later, Plantinga traces the obstacle to appropriate attitudes to our ignorance of why God permits horrific evils:
"A Christian must admit that he doesn't know why God permits the
evils this world displays. This can be deeply perplexing and deeply
disturbing. It can lead a believer to take towards God an attitude he
himself deplores; it can tempt him to be angry with God, to mistrust
God, to adopt an attitude of bitterness and rebellion. "48
Confronted with this, he agrees, his own arguments-that evils do not tell
logically or probabilistically against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient,
and perfectly good God~ffer "cold and abstract comfort. "49
Once again, I think Plantinga's focus on defense obscures genuine continuities
between theoretical and practical problems of evil. The Best of All Possible
Worlds or Free Will Defenses are "cold and abstract comfort," because they
vindicate divine goodness and power only along the dimension "producer of
global goods" and not that of "agent-centered goodness." Personal and proximate
experience of horrific evils gives one prima facie reason to doubt the latter,
even where their compossibility with the former has been assured. The Jews in
Auschwitz had reason to doubt whether God's plan included goodness to them,
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and this contributed to their psychological difficulty in maintaining an attitude
of trust towards God.
An aporetic approach to the problem of evil, which focuses on understanding
how God's agent-centered goodness could be compos sible with horrific evils,
treats the theoretical in such a way as to have a more direct bearing on the
practical. To be sure, the "why-questions" will find their resolution, not in
philosophical journals (see section 6, suggestion (II) above), but in the individual's Job-like fight with God. Yet, insofar as a Christian understanding of
evil successfully sketches a plot-line, following which God can make meaningful
the darkest sufferings and wonderful the total life experience of the death-camp
victims, it defeats the reason to doubt which horrific suffering provides, and
contributes cognitive and hence some psychological resistance to bitterness and
rebellion. I agree with Plantinga that genuine comfort will match created suffering
with the suffering of God Himself. But according to the approach I recommend,
philosophical and religious counsel can be the same.
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